The Desperation Conundrum: How HSM Is Unravelling Somalia
This commentary below is written by prominent MP Dr Mursal Khalif, a member of Somalia’s opposition alliance. It has been lightly edited for brevity and to conform with our editorial style-guide. The views expressed are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sahan Research.
Sahan welcomes robust and critical opinion pieces on topical issues from our readers. If you would like to contribute, please contact The Somali Wire Team.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
For decades, the Somali people have endured a critical need for stable, effective governance. However, the longer Somalis have striven for a modern state capable of ensuring both good governance and a peaceful environment, the more elusive that goal appears to have become.
Reflecting on the Arta Reconciliation Conference of 26 years ago, one may conclude that only marginal progress has been achieved to date. Consequently, the nation now stands on the precipice of a crisis comparable to, or perhaps more severe than, that of the year 2000.
Targeted violence
Over the past two-plus decades of Somalia's nation-building process, numerous tragic milestones of violent conflict have been recorded. However, three distinct instances of targeted political violence against specific individuals stand apart.
The first occurred in September 2006, when a suicide bombing targeted the late transitional President, Abdullahi Yusuf, who fortunately survived. The perpetrator of that horrific attack was the now-infamous terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which was then in its infancy.
Alarmingly, two decades later, targeted political assassination has been adopted as an active tactic by the very same state whose own officials have borne the brunt of Al-Shabaab's campaign of violence, typically through improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms for a quarter of a century. Furthermore, the style of these targeted operations has fundamentally evolved; the crude methods of the past have been replaced by state-sanctioned, high-tech warfare, utilising one-way kamikaze drones, Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and F-16 fighter jets.
The second instance took place in June of this year, nearly two months after his constitutional mandate had expired, when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) ordered simultaneous attacks on the Mogadishu residences of former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire. According to reports from the targeted victims, this operation utilised both mortars and kamikaze drones.
The third escalation occurred three months later, in September, when General Mahad Abdirahman, aka Mahad Shub, the former commander of Somalia's Custodial Corps, fell victim to an aerial strike. Mercifully, he survived. According to his own testimony, this assault was conducted by an American-made, Turkish-owned F-16 fighter jet. Notably, unlike former President Sharif and former Prime Minister Khaire, General Mahad was targeted 470 kilometres away from Mogadishu — the seat of HSM's presidential palace, which he continues to occupy, albeit unconstitutionally.
Divide-and-conquer
From Beledweyne to Baidoa and Doolow, no district, region, or Federal Member State has been spared the destabilising impact of President HSM’s unconstitutional efforts to cling to power. This widespread chaos raises the question of whether there is a method to the madness.
How a PhD holder, former educator, and civil society leader — who helped build the nation during his first term (2012–2016) — could now pursue policies that threaten to dismantle it during his second term (2022–2026) is baffling.
The short-term benefit of these militarised domestic politics is clear: it is a classic strategy of divide-and-rule. By engineering conflicts between districts and Federal Member States, instigating sub-clan warfare, and keeping the Mogadishu-based opposition fractured, HSM systematically weakens any unified national movement that could hold him accountable for his illegal and unconstitutional actions.
The quote "In politics, stupidity is not a handicap" has long been attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, and it finds a striking resonance in contemporary Somalia. The political recklessness of clinging to power past a constitutional mandate, combined with the strategic failure of targeting political rivals in the democratic loyal opposition while Al-Shabaab forces roam freely, threatens to devastate the country.
There is a real risk HSM’s ongoing violent consolidation will leave Somalia in a far more precarious and damaged state than he found it.
International blind spot
While Al-Shabaab introduced suicide bombings to Somalia, HSM’s administration has set a new, dangerous precedent this year by launching aerial strikes against political rivals. More of these state-sponsored attacks are expected in the coming months as his unconstitutional regime tightens its grip on power.
This alarming trend mirrors a recent warning by former US Ambassador Larry André, who stated that HSM’s actions risk turning the national armed forces into a mere "political militia".
The African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have collectively adopted a policy of non-intervention, effectively leaving Somalis to their own devices. Within the Halane compound — the heavily fortified green zone that houses Western embassies, UN offices, and African Union peacekeepers — the prevailing mantra is that international actors are simply "letting Somalis solve their own issues". However, when HSM hears this rhetoric, he interprets it as a blank cheque to extend his stay in office beyond his constitutional mandate, suppress political opponents, manipulate regional elections within Federal Member States, and misappropriate millions from the national coffers.
Leaving a fragile state — beset by deep-rooted clan grievances and significant territorial control by transnational terrorist groups — to resolve its complex political disputes under an entrenched, legitimacy-starved regime is a recipe for catastrophe. Ultimately, when HSM eventually vacates office, the profound implications of his cumulative actions may render Somalia entirely ungovernable. Consequently, both regional stability and global security are bound to suffer severely.
The historical window for meaningful state-building in Somalia is rapidly closing. If the international community continues to ignore the weaponisation of state apparatus against domestic dissidents, it will not just be witnessing the decline of a single administration, but the structural unravelling of a nation. Should these trends persist unchecked, the day after HSM vacates his office, he will leave behind a fragmented, combustible landscape — a tragic testament to a desperation conundrum that promised security but ultimately delivered a failed state.
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