Issue No. 128

The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma 

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources. 

The prospect of a US-Eritrea détente is almost certain to trigger a dramatic geopolitical ferment in the Horn, reignite the debate about the Trump Administration’s foreign policy choices and alignment with Egypt – the latter, a development likely to further roil Washington’s complicated relations with Ethiopia. The Eritrean exiled opposition movement, meanwhile, will likely be disappointed the Asmara regime is being rehabilitated and stands to gain renewed geostrategic prominence, undermining their long campaign for its isolation.

Domestically, a thaw in relations with US and other major Western states and sanctions relief could, potentially, spur foreign investment and speed up completion of flagship development projects in mining and energy sectors; A 30-megawatt solar photovoltaic power plant in Dekemhare (southern Eritrea) is being built with support from the African Development Bank, targeting completion by 2027; meanwhile, the massive Colluli potash mine (in the Danakil Depression, southeast of Asmara), still under construction, is expected to be fully operational by late 2027 and could eventually yield up to 10% of the country's GDP.

A fraught history

The Trump administration's logic for a reset is straightforward in geopolitical terms: Eritrea controls roughly 1,338 kilometres of Red Sea coastline and the Dahlak Archipelago - among the most strategically coveted territories on earth. With Houthi disruption of Red Sea shipping in 2025, the Iran-US confrontation unresolved, Tehran still tightening the noose on the Strait of Hormuz, Eritrea's coastline has acquired renewed salience. By lifting sanctions on Eritrea and gaining influence, Washington is able to deny Russia, China, and Iran strategic naval footprints or intelligence footholds along the Eritrean coast. 

US Special Envoy for Africa Massad Boulos’s primary interest in engaging Eritrea in recent months is to restrain it from launching new hostilities against Ethiopia and to reduce its stakes in Tigray. Washington has been following reports of war mobilisation between the two neighbours and the unravelling of the Pretoria Agreement with concern and is believed to have been instrumental in leaning on Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to reduce his hostile rhetoric and threats of annexing the Port of Assab. 

While the US, undoubtedly, wields significant leverage over Ethiopia, doubts remain as to whether it can sustain its tempering influence in the long-term and render a fresh border war unlikely or impossible. By lifting sanctions on Eritrea without extracting firm commitments of peaceful settlement with Ethiopia, or requiring wider political reforms and human rights accountability, Washington risks emboldening Asmara to continue to act against Ethiopia and to reinforce its alignment with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). 

Initially imposed in response to brutal human rights abuses during the 2020-2022 Tigray war, the sanctions include an arms embargo and a prohibition on assisting Eritrean military activities. Lifting these sanctions prematurely risks undermining opportunities for modifying regime behaviour on basic freedoms, political reform and human rights. Furthermore, economic relief from lifted sanctions, whilst beneficial to the ailing national economy, could indirectly strengthen the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), thus stabilising Afewerki’s repressive regime. 

Previous US administrations have deliberately chosen to leave the position of Ambassador to Eritrea vacant, maintaining diplomatic representation solely through a Chargé d’Affaires since 2010. Eritrea’s persistent repression of civil liberties, press freedoms, and political dissidents has been a primary driver of this downgraded diplomatic status. As a consequence of these strained bilateral relations, the US features prominently in President Isaias Afewerki’s domestic propaganda, where it is routinely blamed for Eritrea’s geopolitical isolation and economic hardship. Consequently, any unexpected realignment in US-Eritrea relations may compel the Eritrean leadership to fundamentally redefine its state-sanctioned narrative.

The Cairo factor

Cairo’s diplomatic mediation in the US-Eritrea dialogue raises fundamental geopolitical questions, particularly given that Egypt’s adversarial stance toward Ethiopia remains unchanged. Grappling with regional economic stagnation, dwindling revenues from a disrupted Suez Canal, and an unresolved water-sharing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Cairo’s strategic imperative is to keep Addis Ababa geopolitically contained and preoccupied by hostile neighbours. 

These mutual benefits are further amplified by new maritime agreements that grant the Egyptian Navy access to Eritrean ports and establish a direct commercial shipping lane between the two nations. By facilitating a diplomatic detente between Eritrea and the United States, Cairo counters Ethiopian Red Sea ambitions, asserts leverage in the Horn of Africa, and rebuilds its influence, thereby helping to insulate its fragile economy from regional shocks.

Plausibly, diplomats leading the discreet dialogue may be underestimating the complexity and broader regional repercussions. Historically, Afewerki's regime has been known for making abrupt foreign policy shifts, offering no assurances that Washington will be insulated from the diplomatic fallout. Consequently, any divergence in strategic priorities could precipitate a swift collapse of the nascent US-Eritrean detente. This structural fragility is further exacerbated by the highly transactional framework both Washington and Asmara apply to foreign agreements. Ultimately, the strategic benefits favour Eritrea and Cairo over the United States, as Asmara will almost certainly leverage maritime access to extract substantial diplomatic, military and economic concessions.

Implications for Ethiopia

Landlocked Ethiopia has long sought unconditional access to the Red Sea. Under Prime Minister Abiy, the access to the Red Sea agenda has steadily developed from an economic aspiration into a geopolitical doctrine woven into the notion of Ethiopia as an assertive regional power. In Abiy’s eyes, access to Assab not only represents an economic imperative, but is intricately linked to sovereignty, strategic autonomy and long-term state security.

The tentative thaw in US-Eritrean relations marks the first step toward a structural realignment in the Horn of Africa, indicative of a modest shift away from Washington's traditional reliance on Ethiopia as its primary regional security interlocutor. Concurrently, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Eritrea maintain that Red Sea governance and maritime security must remain the exclusive purview of littoral states, explicitly rejecting external or non-state frameworks. By engaging Asmara via Cairo’s mediation, the United States implicitly endorses the emerging Egypt-Saudi-Eritrea alignment aimed at exerting maritime influence. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 has only served to sharpen the increasingly adversarial competition in the Red Sea arena. An Arab-led Red Sea security architecture effectively marginalises non-littoral/landlocked regional actors such as Ethiopia while projecting influence and power over critical maritime choke points. Consequently, Addis Ababa will likely view this detente with severe alarm, interpreting it as a deliberate containment strategy—an assessment that carries substantial geopolitical weight given Cairo's central role in the mediation. 

Wider fallout

US alignment with Egypt and Eritrea inadvertently inserts Washington into the proxy-driven Sudanese civil war. The conflict anchors a wider network of regional feuds, primarily the Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry. Currently, the Egyptian, Eritrean, and Saudi-backed Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) confront the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is supported by the UAE and Ethiopia. Both regional rivals supply training and weapons to their respective proxies, turning Eastern Sudan and Port Sudan into vital logistical supply routes. 

Beyond the immediate fallout in Sudan, Washington faces a broader multi-layered theater in the Horn of Africa. Countering Russia’s naval ambitions in Sudan, China's base in Djibouti, and shifting Gulf control over strategic ports remains critical as external powers increasingly turn the region into a competitive battleground.

In conclusion, Eritrea's strategic coastline has emerged as a central focal point in the broader geopolitical contest defining maritime access, logistics corridors, and regional dominance in the Horn of Africa. Washington's engagement extends far beyond stabilizing the Eritrean littoral; it represents a proactive effort to deny adversarial powers enduring military and political footholds along a critical global maritime choke point. However, this strategy carries severe systemic risks. In pursuing a détente with Eritrea in the absence of a wider structured dialogue with Ethiopia and other regional states, Washington risks entrenching the anti-Ethiopian regional axis led by Egypt and potentially inflaming the volatile geopolitics of the sub-region. Ultimately, the United States faces a delicate balancing act, whether the short-term securing of Red Sea access could come at the cost of long-term regional stability.